Abstract-We examine a modified Naming Game in the mean field where there are multiple degrees of ambivalence. Once an agent in one state fears an opinion one way or another, he or she moves one step in the appropriate direction. In the absence of zealots, the two consensus states are stable steady states and the uniform distribution is an unstable steady state. With zealots for one opinion only, there is a critical value below which there are three steady states and above which there is only one. Consensus in favor of the zealots' opinion is the steady state that always exists, and is stable. The second steady state is the uniform distribution in the absence of zealots, and moves away from the zealots' opinion as the number of zealots increases. This state is unstable. The last steady state starts at consensus against the zealots, and moves toward the zealots' opinion as the number of zealots increases. This state is stable. When zealots are added on both sides, the "beak" pattern observed for the Naming Game remains, with the region of multiple steady states growing with the addition of more intermediate states.
I. INTRODUCTION
The science of social interaction is a very alluring field. To understand how humans influence each other provides the opportunity to control how public opinion shapes itself. The difficulty is that the human brain is too complex to allow for a simple and clearly accurate model of human opinion formation. As such, a number of approximations have been proposed, each with its own shortcomings. Of interest is the rather simple voter model. Here, each person, or agent, has one of two conflicting opinions, A or B. As the agents talk to each other, they try to convince each other of their own opinions. One agent is chosen as the speaker and the other is chosen as the listener. If the speaker and listener agree, then there is no change in the opinion state, but if they initially disagree, then the listener is converted to the speaker's opinion. [2, 4, 5, 9, 11, 12, 17, 18] Of particular interest is the parameter m, the magnetization of the system. The magnetization is the expected poll result and is calculated by
, where ρA represents the density of people in favor of opinion A and ρB represents the density of people in favor of opinion B. Note that, for the voter model, ρA + ρB = 1. In this case, the variables ρA and ρB are martingales, and given enough time, the system will almost surely go to one of two absorbing states, that of full consensus at A and that of full consensus at B. [2, 4, 5, 9, 11, 12, 18] A more interesting model is the Naming Game model, or Binary Agreement Model. Here, the possibility of ambivalence is accounted for. In addition to the two extremist states A and B, there is the state AB, which represents ambivalence. In this model, agents in AB are no more or less likely to speak or be spoken to than anyone else. If the chosen speaker is in the ambivalent state, then he or she will subconsciously choose one of the two opinions. If the listener is in the ambivalent state, then he or she will change to whichever opinion he or she hears. [ an opinion on an ambivalent speaker, this is ignored in the Listener-Only Naming Game model. [4, 18] In this model, the values ρA, ρB, and ρAB are no longer martingales. In fact, once one side begins to dominate, (this dominance can be determined by the magnetization, which is now calculated by m = ρ AB +2ρ A 2
) this dominance will tend to grow until consensus is reached. The consensus points are stable steady states while perfect balance between ρA, ρB, and ρAB is an unstable steady state. [1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19] A further generalization allows for the agents to be leaning in one direction or another to varying degrees without full commitment to one idea or the other. If a listener hears one opinion or the other, he or she moves one step in the direction of the opinion he or she hears. [18] The parameter K represents the number of times that an agent convinced of opinion B needs to hear opinion A in order to be convinced of opinion A, and vice versa. The population densities in each state are now denoted ρ0, ρ1, ...ρK , where ρ0 represents commitment to opinion B, ρK represents commitment to opinion A, and the other states are the various ambivalent states. The states themselves (as opposed to the populations of the states,) are denoted N0, N1...NK . An agent in state Ni will speak in favor of opinion A with probability i K and opinion B with probability
. Note that the Voter Model corresponds to K = 1 and the Naming Game model corresponds to K = 2. [18] One other factor involved is the presence of zealots in favor of one opinion of the other. A zealot operates with a motive that ignores all logic and thus can never be convinced to change his or her opinion. No amount of convincing can turn a non-zealot, or normal agent, into a zealot. The presence of these zealots affects the dynamics of the system as well as the possible longterm outcomes. [1, 3, 4, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 17, 18] II. THE NO-ZEALOT CASE The behavior of a network obeying one of these models can be characterized by its long term behavior in the mean field. That is to say, what possible steady-states are there and which of them are stable. [20] It has already been shown that for the standard Naming Game model, the two consensus points are stable steady states and that the uniform distribution between ρ0, ρ1, and ρ2 is an unstable steady state. [1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19] As it turns out, the analogous result is true for any value of K ≥ 2. Namely, the state ρ0 = 1, ρi = 0 for i = 0 is a stable steady state, as is the state ρK = 1, ρi = 0 for i = K. The only other steady state is at ρi = 1 K+1 for all i, and this state is unstable.
The outline of the proof is as follows: It has been previously shown that a necessary condition for a steady state is that arXiv:1308.2607v1 [math.DS] 12 Aug 2013
is constant (if finite,) for i = 1, 2...K. Furthermore, this quotient is equal to
, where m is the magnetization, or the expected poll result. The magnetization is calculated with the formula m =
It can be shown that this is a necessary and sufficient condition for a distribution to be a steady state. Thus, selecting a value of m between 0 and 1 fully determines the distribution by fixing the ratios of population densities of different states. However, the distribution has a magnetization of its own, and this may or may not be the same as the magnetization used to generate the distribution. If it is the same, then it is a steady state, otherwise it is not. It can be shown that for m = 0, m = 0.5, and m = 1, the resulting distribution has the same magnetization as the one used to generate it. For 0 < m < 0.5, the resulting magnetization is less than the value of m used to generate the distribution, and for 0.5 < m < 1 the resulting magnetization is greater than the one used to generate the distribution.
To address stability, we first look at the states corresponding to m = 0 and m = 1. Because the setup exhibits symmetry, we only need to show stability for one point, and the other point should have the same level of stability. It should be noted that the only distribution with m = 0 is ρ0 = 1, ρi = 0 for i = 0. For distributions near this one, m tends to decrease over time. Thus, the distributions tend toward the minimum value of m, which is m = 0, and there is only one distribution with that magnetization value. The point at m = 0.5 has a different property. Assuming a geometric distribution with m slightly greater than 0.5, the value of m will tend to increase, and if m is slightly less than 0.5, m will tend to decrease. Thus, if the distribution is slightly perturbed from the steady state, the perturbation will grow larger and larger, resulting in instability. A more detailed proof appears in the appendix.
III. STEADY STATES FOR THE UNILATERAL ZEALOT CASE
We now examine the case where, in addition to the normal agents, there are agents with unshakable support for one of the two opinions. We perform calculations assuming the zealots support opinion B, and use symmetry to infer the corresponding results for zealots in favor of opinion A. We denote the population density of zealots in favor of opinion B as ρB. It is worth mentioning that the notion of long-term behavior takes on multiple meanings in this case. If there are no zealots in favor of opinion A, but there is at least one in favor of opinion B, then there is only one absorbing state, namely, that of full consensus at opinion B. Furthermore, it can be shown that this consensus state will be reached with probability 1. [1, 3, 4, 13, 14, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22] So in a sense, the only truly stable steady state is that of consensus at opinion B. However, it is realistically possible for the system to hover in the neighborhood of a particular distribution for a relatively long period of time before drifting to the consensus state. [21, 22] It is these particular distributions which we are looking for. We will call these opinion states "metastable" states. Additionally, we look for the conditions under which these metastable states can exist.
In the case of the Voter Model, it is rather simple. The magnetization is a supermartingale, with martingality holding only for the consensus state. [3, 4, 9, 13, 17, 18] In the Naming Game model, things get more interesting. Consensus at B is always a stable steady state. It has been shown that in the . The values of ρ B that will make a given value of m a steady state for K = 2, 3, 4, and 10. Note that, in each case, the value of ρ B increases up to a point, then decreases. Thus, for each value of ρ B below a critical value, there will be exactly 2 steady states in the interval [0.5, 1] and above this critical value, there will not be any steady states in that interval.
case of ρB = 0, consensus at A is also a stable steady state, and that this stable state drifts toward lower values of m as ρB increases. This is also true for the case K = 3. Additionally, when ρB = 0, the uniform distribution is an unstable steady state. This unstable state moves to one of higher magnetization as ρB increases. [3, 4, 13, 14, 17, 18, 19, 21] This has also been found to be true in the case K = 3. To understand why this is, one needs to understand the relationship between the magnetization m and the magnetization of the normal agents, m normal . We calculate the magnetization of the normal agents by the formula
. If we fix a value of m and force the normal agents into a geometric distribution obeying
, then the value of m normal is determined. It can be shown that the number of zealots committed to opinion B can be determined from the formula
As it turns out, the results regarding the existence and metastability of steady states are true as long as
dm 2 is of one sign over the interval (0.5, 1) and another over the interval (0, 0.5). Similar to the no-zealot case, a necessary condition for a steady state is the relationship
. A subtle difference between this case and the no-zealot case is that ρB is now a parameter, and while it does not directly affect any of the ρi values, it does directly affect m. In particular, as ρB increases, m decreases. Thus, in cases where m normal > m, there is a suitable ρB that will enable the equation
Recall the result that if a geometric distribution is generated from a magnetization m then the resulting magnetization will exceed the generating magnetization for 0.5 < m < 1. Thus, for 0.5 < m < 1, there is a positive value of ρB that will make the distribution steady. By symmetry, for 0 < m < 0.5, there is a value of ρA that will make the distribution steady if ρB = 0. It can be shown that this special value of ρB is unique and is a continuous function of m. This means that, as long as the special value of ρB is of one concavity as m varies, (in this case, concave down,) the steady states will each move in one direction as m increases. Because ρB is bounded by 0 and 1, there must be some maximum value of ρB that yields a steady state other than consensus at B. The continuity of ρB shows that multiple steady states must meet at this maximum. Empirical evidence suggests that the stability of these steady states does not change until they meet at this critical value of ρB. A more detailed proof appears in the appendix. 
IV. TIPPING POINTS FOR THE CASE OF BILATERAL ZEALOTS
As we have already mentioned, stability, and thus, long-term sustainability of non-consensus states depends on the number of zealots. This effect is even further pronounced when there are not only zealots in favor of opinion B, but also in favor of opinion A. [10, 11, 12, 17, 19] Examining the data in figures 6-9, which examine the conditions under which multiple steady states exist, several phenomena are noticed. First, if there are sufficiently few committed agents total, there will be multiple steady states. Second, if there are significantly more zealots in favor of one opinion than the other, there is only a single steady-state. Finally, if there are enough zealots, there will only be one steady state. [10, 11, 12, 17, 19] This holds even when the zealots are perfectly evenly divided between opinions A and B. [11, 17, 19] This case is of particular interest, as it implies that, given enough zealots, the equilibrium uniform distribution becomes a stable steady state. [10, 11, 12, 17, 19] More interestingly, it becomes the only stable steady state, and thus, given enough time, the system should always be near this state.
We find the critical value of ρA and ρB above which the uniform distribution of normal agents is stable. Let α represent the fraction of agents who are not zealots. We also assume that the system is near the uniform distribution. Because there is little drift here, we can assume that the system is near a geometric distribution, as the value of m would have been approximately constant for a long time. Because the system is nearly uniform, we assume r = 1 + . This gives us the following equations: 
for i = 0, 1, 2...K Note that, because is small, (1 + ) i ≈ 1 + i , giving us
for i = 0, 1, 2...K To calculate m for this distribution, we can first calculate m for the zealots, then calculate m for the normal agents, and take a weighted average. Because the zealots are evenly distributed between ρA and ρB, we know that, for this group of zealots, m zealots = 0.5. For the normal agents, the calculation is more involved.
Evaluating the sum, and using the formula for the sum of squares, we get
Factoring out a K+1 from the numerator and denominator, expanding in powers of epsilon, and dropping everything after the linear term, we get
To find the overall value of m, we take a weighted average of m normal and m zealots .
Next, to check for stability, we calculate E[
]. When this figure has the same sign as , the equilibrium state is unstable, and when it has the opposite sign, the uniform distribution is stable.
Expanding in powers of and dropping everything after the linear terms, we get
Note that the uniform distribution is stable whenever
> 0. As a result, we get .
APPENDIX A DETAILED MATHEMATICAL PROOFS
In the case without zealots, ρA = ρB = 0. Let the distribution of agents in the various opinion states be represented by the K+1 dimensional vector [ρ0, ρ1, ...ρK ]. Let m represent the magnetization of this distribution. Assume the distribution to be a steady state. Let φi+ be the expected flux over one time step from state Ni to state Ni + 1. This is, by definition, the expected number of listeners in state i who hear opinion A. We define a time step such that one conversation occurs per unit time. The probability that a listener is in state i is simply ρi. The probability that a listener hears opinion A is roughly the same for all potential listeners, (assuming a sufficiently large complete network,) and is equal to the magnetization. Thus, we have
for i = 0, 1, 2...K −1. φK+ = 0 because there is no state NK+1 for the agents to move into. Similarly, we can define φi− as the expected flux from state Ni to state Ni−1. We have
If a distribution is a steady state, the flux from state Ni to state Ni+1 must be matched by the flux from state Ni+1 to state Ni. Thus, we have the equations
for m = 1. The special cases of m = 0 and m = 1 are the absorbing states, and are clearly steady states. The case m = 0.5 produces a steady state. In this case
Because all K+1 population densities are equal and they sum to 1, we have ρi = 1 K+1 for all i. The only question is whether or not the magnetization of the resulting distribution is, in fact, 0.5.
Because the distribution is geometric and the resulting magnetization is equal to the magnetization used to generate the distribution, it is a steady state. Thus, steady states are achieved for the geometric distributions generated by magnetizations of 0, 0.5, and 1.
In the case where 0 < m < 0.5, when m is used to generate a distribution and K ≥ 2, the resulting magnetization is strictly less than the one used to generate the distribution, and the when 0.5 < m < 1, the resulting magnetization is strictly greater than the one used to generate the distribution. This means that, in either case, the distribution is not a steady state as the ratio
. The proof is shown for the case 0.5 < m < 1 and an analogous proof can be used for the case 0 < m < 0.5.
Suppose K = 1. Let ρ0 = 1−x and ρ1 = x. The magnetization of this distribution is
and the ratio of adjacent states is
Thus, for K = 1, any geometric distribution is a steady state. If K is increased by 1 and the same ratio . We calculate the magnetization of the new distribution, mnew.
We examine the sign of
Note that, because of the ratio
and the restrictions taken on x, ρK must be greater than any of the other values of ρi. Thus, ρK >
In the case K = 1, we have m old = x and we will show, by induction, that for K ≥ 2, m old ≥ x, which gives us ρK+1 >
Because mnew > m old and m old ≥ , so the distribution is not a steady state. Note that this inequality also validates the induction used earlier.
Having found the steady states, we examine their stability. Consider the "magnetization norm" ||x||m = (1/K)(|x1| + 2|x2|+...+K|xK |). First, we show that this quantity is, in fact, a norm. Because it is a sum of absolute values, it is nonnegative, and 0 only when each component is 0.
Next, note that for realizable distributions, xi ≥ 0, so the absolute value bars can be ignored. Thus, ||x||m = (1/K)(x1 + 2(x2) + ... + K(xK )) = m. At consensus, ||x||m = 0. We examine what happens in a neighborhood of consensus such that ||x||m ≤
2KN
. Note that this means that ρi = 0 for i > K/2 and that ρ0 ≤ 1 − 2m. We examine ∆m, the change in m over a single time step.
for 0 < m < 0.5. Thus, the value of ||x||m will decrease, and the point is stable. An analogous argument holds for the point of consensus at A.
Next, we examine the stability of the uniform distribution. In a sufficiently small neighborhood of this distribution, none of the population densities are 0. This allows us to describe the distribution with the vector of ratios of densities of adjacent states, [
... > 0. We claim that if the minimum ratio of densities of adjacent states is some rmin(t) > 1, then after one time step, the minimum ratio of densities is some rmin(t + 1) > rmin(t). Let's first examine the ratio
We fix ρi and attempt to minimize (t + 1). Suppose that ρi+1 > rmin(t)(ρi). Then, for sufficiently large N, ρi+1 and ρi would change sufficiently little to keep
. To do this, we minimize ρi+1(t + 1) and maximize ρi(t + 1). This is achieved by minimizing ρi+2(t) and maximizing ρi−1(t). Obeying the constraint that
ρi(t) = ρi(t) (52)
The new values of the relevant densities are
The quotient of these terms is
≥ ρi(t)(rmin(t)(
= rmin(t) (59)
Thus, the if the minimum ratio of densities of adjacent opinion states decreases, it must involve one of the extreme states. We examine the case i = 0. Similar to before, we have
≥ ρ0(t)(rmin(t)(
The numerator of this fraction is a special case of the numerator of equation 58. The denominator differs by an additive term of (ρ0(t)) × (
Thus, the denominator is smaller, so the quotient is larger, and we have
Finally, we examine the case where i = K − 1.
Comparing this quotient to equation 64, we find that the denominator can be factored into the same form, but the numerator has an additive constant of ρK ×(
Again, we have
Thus, the numerator is greater and the denominator is the same as in equation 58, so the quotient is greater. Again, we have
Thus, rmin(t) in this case is a non-decreasing function of t, so it will never drop back down to 1. The uniform distribution is unstable.
In the case of unilateral zealots, either ρA = 0 or ρB = 0. For simplicity, we assume ρA = 0 and infer the corresponding results for ρB = 0 by symmetry. The distribution of agents in each non-zealot opinion state must still be geometric, so for fixed ρB we can determine the distribution by the parameter m. Note that, given a distribution of normal agents and zealots, we have the relation
Note that, in the case where ρA = 0, m zealots = 0, so the equation reduces to
In the case without zealots, we know that the only values of m which yield steady states are 0, 0.5, and 1. The question now arises, for other values of m is there a value of ρB such that there is a steady state with that value of m. We solve for any value of ρB that would make this possible.
We have the added restrictions that 0 ≤ ρB ≤ 1. This can be achieved whenever m normal − m ≥ 0. As we have previously shown, this occurs whenever 0 < m < 0.5. Thus, for those values of m there exists a unique ρB such that equilibrium exists at that particular m. This is consistent with what has been shown in the case K = 2. In that particular case, it was found that for sufficiently small ρB there were three values of m where equilibrium was achieved. One was consensus at B. The others started at m = 0.5 and m = 1 and as ρB increased, the corresponding equilibrium values of m approached each other. At some critical value of ρB, the equilibrium states meet, and above that critical value, they vanish, and only the one equilibrium point, (consensus at B,) remains. This will occur if
The state of consensus at B can be shown to be stable using the aforementioned magnetization norm. Again, examine the neighborhood of consensus such that ||x||m <
over the interval (0, 0.5), showing that the point is stable. assuming that the pattern of three equilibrium points for sufficiently small ρB holds, it can be shown that the middle one is unstable. Note that, under these assumptions, the value of ρB needed to maintain equilibrium increases as m increases. Thus, as m increases and is used to generate a geometric distribution, the resulting value of m will be greater than the one used to generate the distribution. (It should be noted that in the case of the last equilibrium point, the opposite is true.) Because the quantities ρ0, ρ1... are nonzero, and because the value of ρB is fixed, we can determine the distribution (and any others near it,) with the vector [r1, r2, ...rK ], where ri = 
Note that, for the greater value of m, a greater value of ρB is needed to bring equilibrium. Thus, if m * is above the equilibrium value, than the value of m of the distribution generated by m * is greater than m * . With this, and logic similar to the no-zealot case, it can be shown that the ratio of ρ1 to ρ0 will remain above m * 1−m * . An analogous argument holds for the ratio of ρK to ρK−1. Thus, the point is unstable.
